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AN ALTE?.JlATIVE TEEORETICAL APPROL.C: TO TLS DIPACT OF
FOREIGlf LNCSTNENT ON Tl-fC HOST COUNTRY

Benjamin I. Cohen*
October 1972

Perhaps because of the impact of the Ricardian em~hasis on the international
immobility of capital and labor, economic theory has had relatively little
to say about the impact of international investments by corporations.
article is one of the few theoretical articles in this area.

MacDougall's

Caves and Johnson.

in the late 1960 'Sp wrote that ·tracDougall 's essay on foreign investment •••points

1
out the special characteristics of this form of international factor movements .•• "

Other readers of HacDougallvs article may not easily discern these special
characteristics, and at the end of his article r'acDougall says that "no distinction
,
•
.
.
r,2
i s mad e b etween fi xe d interest ano. equity investment.

things, perfect competition, lfacDougall concludes that

Assuming, among other
11

the most important

direct gains ••• from more rather than less private investment from abrcatl seem
likely to come through higher tax revenue from foreign profits (at least if
the higher investnent is not induced by lower tax rates), through economies of

scale and through external economies generally, especially where [local] firms
acquire 'know-how' or are forced by foreign competition to adopt more efficient

*I have benefitted from extensive discussions with Richard Brecher. Carlos
Diaz Alejandro also made helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Ann Horgan helped with the computer analysis. Financial support for this
research comes from NSF Grant Ho. GS33741X. I am solely respousible for the
contents of this paper.

1Readings in International Economics, ed. Richard E. Caves and Harry G.
Johnson (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), p. vii.
2
G.D.A. HacDougall, ilThe Benefits and Costs of Private Investment from
Abroad: A Theoretical Approach,n Economic Record (Uarch 1960), reprinted
in Readings in International Economics, ed. Richard E. Caves and Harry G.
Johnson (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., :.i.968) 1 p. 193.

]
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methods. 111

However, the host country may be worse off~ according to MacDougall,

if foreign firms are in such a monopolistic position that they exploit local
buyers.

2

This last "qualification" in HacDougallvs analysis becomes the core
of less formal analysis by other economists.

As my colleague Carlos Diaz

Alejandro put it, "much [direct foreign investment] in Latin .America has
occurred in areas and sectors where markets and competition are weak.
competitive models] wculd miss most of what the argument is about. 113

[Pure
Even

among developed countries the assumption of perfect competition fails in that
it cannot easily explain two-way foreign investment in the same industry. 4

Within the framewcrk of perfect competition~ NacDougallvs formal
analysis pays 01.ly slight attention to the impact of the technology brought
y f oteign firms
b

5

and, b y using a one sector mo de,
l ignores the consequences

of having foreign invest:11ent in only one part of the econor;,y.

The transfer

of technology and th3 operati.on in only certain sectors of the economy are
,
two well documented tendencies of :fore:'..gn investment oy corporations. 0
1

2

Ibid., p. 193.
Ibid. , p • 186 •

3carlos F. Diaz Alejandro,

11

Direct Foreign Investment in Latin America,n
The International Corporation, ed. Charles P. Kindleberger (Cambridge, Hass.:
MIT Press, 1970), p. 319.
4

The importance of monopolistic elements was developetl by Stephen Hymer. For
an exposition of his thesis, see Charles P. Kindleberger, American Business Abroad
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 11-25. For a discussion of the
importance of oligopolistic market structure in predicting foreign investment, see
Richard E. Caves, "International Corporations: The Industrial Economics of Foreign
Investment, vi Economic a, Vol. 38 (February 1971) 9 pp. 1-2 7.
5

MacDougall notes tha.t the introduction of a heavily labor-saving technology
could make the host country worse ofL Eac1)ougall, op. cit., p, 182.
6

See, for example, Raymo:1d Verr;.on, Sovereignty at Bay, The ?1ultinational
Spread of U.S. Enterpri:;;E;s CTe.w York: Basic Books9 1971).
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The next sectiO'.':'. of t:ds paper is a ·:heoretical critique of the
introduction of a foreig:i. technology within the i.:iacDougall framework of a
one sector economy.

The following s£ction considers the impact of introducing

profit maximizing firms and a new technology into one pcrtion of a two sector
economy when some local producers do not maximize profits.

These are

important because, as my colleague Richard Brecher pointed out, in a two-sector
11
economy foreign capital has no effect on the domestic income of a i:small

country unless it e:i.ther brings a new techno1.ogy or changes behavior.

This

1
conclusion follows from the ''Rybczynski effect 11 ~ with world prices fixed,

perfect competition, universal prof"t maxi.nization, and a given linear
homogeneous production. function in e::1.d-;. sector, the arrival of foreign capital
has no impact on the domestic wage or :..nte;.:-est rate and hence no impact on
domestic income,
1
11
The purpose of ::.hese two sectioe.s is to show that under 'plausible

assumptions foreign :1.nvestment can make the host country worse off if it

brings an inappropriate technology. The pa?er ignores such dynamic considerations

as the impact of forzigners o:n domestic savings rates and on donestic
entrepreneurs ana is in the comparative statics tradition.
1

Factor Endowmen:t and Relative Commodity Prices, 11
Economica, Vol. 22 rnovember 1955). reprinted in Caves and Johnson, op. cit.
T. U. Rybczynski,

11

-4II.

The "1inappropr::Late tecbnology1. argumen,t may be graphically illustrated
by slightly modifying HacDougall 9 s approach.

Assume perfect competition in

the host country, full emplo-yment, and no taxes on profits earned by foreign
investors.

Suppose initially all capital is owned locally and the amount

of capital in the host country is oa.

Then in Diagram I total output (and

domestic income) is the area under the marginal productivity of capital
curve MPK and the rate of proflt is oc.
1
enters the country.

~fow suppose ab of foreign capital

';-Ji th no change in technology, the marginal product of

capital falls in the host country to oj.

Domestic income increases; the

income of local work:!rs increases 1 and the ineome of local capitalists falls.
This is the essence of lracDougall 's m"!alysis .
But suppose the foreir;n capital brings along a new technology which
tilts the marginal productivity curve of capita:. curve to NPI~

11

.

The equilibrium

rate of profit rises to od, and total output is the area under the new
marginal productivity of capital curve (oehb), which may well be larger than
the old total product (ofga).
output:.
abhi).

But now foreisners receive some of this larger

the profit rates times the amount of foreign. capital (or the rectangle
So domestic income ·with foreign capital may be smaller than without

foreign capital; it is an empirical matter of comfaring ofga with oehb minus
abhi.

Even if the host country taxes some of-the profits earned by the foreign

investors, domestic income with the fore.ign investment may be less than it
was without the foreign investment.
As drawn in Diagram I~ the
the

1

foreign1, technology is more profitable than

11

domestic" technology at the :i.ni-:ial level of capital, is not used by

local capit&.lists prior to the arrival of the foreigr.. inves7:ors, and then

-4a-

Diagram I

f

Output

d

k

_ __Ja~.-~b~---C~a·pital
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is used by all local capitalists after the fcreir,ners arri.ve.

How might

one rationalize this assumed sequence? First, one notes that with small

amounts of capital--any amount less than ok in Diagram I--the 1;domestic 1i
technology is more profitable.

Having chosen the 1;domestic i: technology at

low levels of capital, domestic firms, I assume, retain it as the country's
capital stock grows even when, with a larger stock of capital, the "domestic"
technology is less profitable.

In the absence of foreign investments, local

managers could be said to :;forget" about the 1 ·foreign·1: technology.

one views the

Thus,

11

k11owledge' contained in a Jrod.uction function in an innovative

sense rather than as Samuelson defined truth (quoting Ramsey's quote of
Blake):

11

Truth can never be. told so as to be understood and not be believed. 111

The success of Schumpeter I s entrepreneur, on the other hand, " •.• depends upon
intuition, the capacity of seeing th:L1;.gs :Ln a way which afterwards proves to
be true, even though it cannot be established at the moment... ;12

After

demonstrating that the nforeign 11 technology is more profitable (with a large
capital stock) by actually using it to increase profits, the foreign firm, by
assumption:, will be quickly imitatec. by the local firms.

As Schumpeter put

it, "in industries in which there is still competition and a large number of
independent people we see first of all the single appearance of an innovation •••
and then we see how the existing businesses grasp it with varying rapidity
.c.
. . 11y more. 113
an d comp 1 eteness~ .:.1.rst
a f ew, t l1e11 continua

1

Paul A. Samuelso.:l, .i:Cconomists and the History of Ideas, 11 American
Economic Review, VoL 52 (Harch 1962), p. 18.
2

Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (Oxford
University Press paperback, 1961), p. 85.
3

Ibid., p. 229.
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My analysis, like EacDougallrs, is comparative statics and does not
specify how (or whether) the economy moves frat:: one position to another.
In particular, why do all the existing firms change over from the
technology to the "foreignn technology?

1:'\E

11

domestic 11

my colleague Richard Nelson

pointed out to me~ a private monopolis-:.: (or central planner) who wished to
maximize the income of all capitalists would have some of the plants con
tinue using the adomestic 1 ' technology.

My

argument simply demonstrates

that if all firms--local and foreig:1.--behave in the same ,my~ then foreign
investment may reduce he st country incorr,e .

It;,:.may be useful to illustrate this argument with a numerical example.
Suppose the ndomestic 11 producticn funct:Lon is
(II-1)

where O = output, L
the

11

=.,

stock of labor, and X = stock of capital.

Suppose

foreignn produ.::tion fu·1ction 5.s

(II-2)
Thus both production functions are assumed tc belong to the Cobb-Douglas

family.

Assume full emp laymen t, the profit rate ('IT) equal to the marginal

productivity of capital (i"JPK), and the ·wage rate (W) equal to the marginal
productivity of labor (LPL).

Suppose that initially there are 100 units

of labor and 64 units of local donestic capital.

As shown in Column (1)

of Table I, output with the domestic technology is 92.80~ the profit rate is

.725, and local capitalists receive 46.4.

capital are added to the domestic capital.

Suppose that 36 units of foreign
Using dom.estic technology, output

rises--in Column (2)•··-to L.6 and the rate of profit falls to .58.

As foreign

-oaTable 1

Alternative Prod,1ction Functions

"Domestic"

viForeign 11

Ll/4 K3/4

1.16 Ll/2 Kl/2

Output
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

100

100

100

100

100

100

64

mo

25

64

100

25

92.80

116

5)(.)

71.6

100

35.36

Profit Rate

• 725

058

i.n

.839

.75

1.061

Wage Rate

.464

.58

.29

.179

.25

.088

Capital's Income

46.4

58

29

53.7

75

26.52

Labor 9 s Income

46.4

58

29

17.9

25

8.84

0

27

0

Labor Stock
Capital Stock
Output

Foreign
Capital's Income

0

20.88

0

Local
Capital's Income

46.40

37.12

29

53.7

48

26.52

Domestic Income

92.80

95 .12

58

71.6

73

35.36

-7-

capitalists earn 20.88 (.58 time.s 36 = 20.88:,, domestic income is 95.12

(116 - 20.88 = 95.12).

if all firns sh::.ft to tI::e

foreign" technology, then

output--as shown in Col;mn (5)--is 1O8--more than in the absence of foreign
capital but less than us:Lng foreign capital and.
profit rate using the
technology.

11

11

d.omestic 1 ; technology; the

fore::Lg11c technology is • 75, higher than with the "domesticu

Domesti:: income is 73 (100 minus ,75 times 36 = 73), which is

less than if the foreign capital were combined with

0

domestic" technology and

also less th&n in th2 complete absence of fore:1..gn capital. 1

In a one s~ctor mod,2,l, t'b.erefore., cne need not explain a coalition between
local capitalists :::,nd foreign capitalists solely on

11

political'' grounds.

2

Even if foreigners bBhave &s perfect competitors, it is theoretically
possible for foreign ca.p::.tali~;ts t,:, reduce L1e total. income accruing to the
natives, to increase the inc:.one accruing to local capitalists 9 and. to

.1:~-1~E-~ the ir;ccme P.ccruing to lcr.al 1;-.rn:-kers

o

1

Note that at a low level. of domestic capital--say 25 units--the ' 1domestic 11
technology is both rr1ore profitable (1.16 versus 1.061) and more productive
(58 versus 35.36), as shol\TP. by comparing Columns (3) and (6).
2

Baran, fox- example, says :;afraid that hostility toward foreign interests
might deprive them of foreign support in a case of a revolutionary emergency,
the native capitalists deserted their previous anti-imperialist, nationalist
platforms. 1 ; Paul A. Baran, "On the Political Economy of Backwardness,"
The Manchester School (January 1972), reprinted in The Economics of Under
development, ed. A. i-L Agarwala and S. Po Sirgh~ (Oxford University Press
paperback, 1958), p. 80.
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I now consider a two sector economy--agriculturc and manufacturing-
Each commodity is

using two factors of production--labor and capital.

assumed to be produced by a Cobb--Doub1.as :)reduction function, and the quantities
produced are valued at world prices.

1

Symbolically, let Q.]. be the quantity of

the i'th good produced, and let L. and I:. be the amounts of labor and capital
1

1

used in the producticn of the i 9 th good~

{III-1)

where O < y < 1

{III-2)

where O < B <land y > B

The total supply of labor (1) and of capital
11

open unemployment,
{III-3)

C)

are fixed and there is no

so that
L + L, 1
l.
A

::::

L

(III-4)

Initially managers are assumed to lack a r'capitalist" mentality:
than maximize profits, they hire labor until the wage rate

equals a
(w.)
l.

fraction (f.) of the average product of labor in the sector.
l.

rather

Capitalists

used in each sector.
on the caoital
also receive a rate of return (r.)
•
l.
My model is thus closely related to Artl1.ur '..ewis 's

11

subsistence 11 economy,

2

1

For a justification of the use of world prices and a model whose
mathematical structure is similar to this one, see Thomas Birnberg and
11
Benjamin I. Cohen, i'A Theoretical Analysis of Partial Economic Reform,
Economic Growtt. Center Discussion Paper :i.:;o. 135 (December 1971).

2

w.

11

Arthur Lewis, 1 'Econooic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor,
The Manchester School c:ay 1S'j4). See also John C. H. Fei and Gustav Ranis,
Development of the Labor Sur-;:iL:S Economy: Ti~eory and Policy (Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., 196.:i-) and Ri,~ha~·d 1.L Brecher, "Disga!.seC:. Versus O?en Unemployment: A
Trade-Off'' (mimeo, Ccto½er 1971).

though in my model labor does not receive ~he entire agricultural product and
the agricultural wage level is not set exogenously . 1

tJhile labor is paid

a fraction of its average product, I do not assume laborvs marginal product

is zero.

2

(III-5)

where O

<

where O

< f

fA

<

1

(III-6)

(III-7)

K.11
[ L"'
H

l

1-B
1

ff

< 1

d

(III-8)

I assume cap:5..ta:.ists and le.borers move cap:Ltal and labor around until wage
rates and interest 7".'ates are equal in both sectors:
(III-9)
(III-10)

I also assume the country is so small that its output does not affect the

1

r also assume that both labor and capital are used in agriculture and that the
capital-labor ratio is higher in manufacturing. For example, Ho presents data that
indicate that in Taiwan in 1951 the capital-labor ratio of agriculture was about
one-sixth that of non-agriculture . Ho says the wage in agriculture in Taiwan is
set by the average product of labor in agriculture. Yhi-llin Ho, 1'Development with
Surplus Population--The Case. of Taiwan~ A Critique of the Classical Two-Sector
Model, a la Lewis, i; _Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 20 (January
1972). pp. 212, 213~ 224.
2Little,
Scitovsky and Scott conclude~ "there is now a wide consensus
of opinion that this ~arginal product (of labor in agriculture) is significantly
greater than zero even in the most overpopulateci countries suc::1 as India and
Pakistan. 11 Ian I..ittL", Tibor 3citovsky, and llaurice Scott, Industry and Trade
in Some Deve:oping Count:i:it,s, A ::::-::i,-1para.tive Stud:: (Oxford University Press
paperback, 1970), p. 14-6.
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world prices of the two soods (PA and P ).
11
PA

= PM = 1.

For simplicit y, I let

When there are no foreigner s in ,:he country, output (Y)

equals domestic income (DI).
(III-11)

(III-12)

Y = DI

Once we stipulate the total amount of capital, the total amo·unt of labor,
and the fraction of the ave::age product which workers receive as a wage
rate in each sector, we can solve this syGtem of 12 equations describin g a
"pre-cap italist" economy.
Now suppose a group of foreigner s arrive~ bringing additiona l capital
(FK), a

11

capitalis t" mentaJ.ity , and a new technolog y.

is to maximize prof:its, 1

Their sole objective

It bas been commonly observed that foreign capitalis ts

invest in only part of the economy.

Assume that foreirner s invest in manu

facturing and that all capitalis ts in the manufactu ring sector thereupon be
come profit maximize: rs; they therefore all hire labor until its marginal
product equals the irnge rate.

In the agricultu re sector labor is still hired

until its wage equals a fraction of its average product.

A

"mixed economy 11

now exists.
As foreigner s only invest in manufactu ring, the new technolog y is
confined to manufactu ring, and so equation (III-2) becomes
(III-2')
1

.... 1-B'
lZH

As Little, Scitovsky , and Scott put it, foreign capitalis ts n ••• manifest
[a] greater reliance on careful calculatio ns of costs and profitab ility than
is customary in developin g countries . 1' Ian Little, Tibor Scitovsky , and
Maurice Scott, op. cit,, p, 57.

-11-

What will happen to domestic incowP., i,e.~ to total output less profits
earned by the foreigners on their capital?
since at least some firms are behaving

A quick answer might be that

"rationally" (i.e., maximizing profj ts) and

since the capital stock is larger, domestic income will rise in a fashion
analogous to I:facDouga.11 1 s analysis of a one sector economy.

But there is

a new technology and also the possibility of a ' 1Second-Bese· 1 situation,
since only the manufacti:tring sector maximizes profits.
"mixed economy" equations

Thus, in this new

are replaced by~

(III-7 ')

(III-8')

As the capital stock is lar3er, equa·don (III-4) is replaced by

Domestic income is less than output because of the income of foreign

cap"italists, and so equation (III-12) is replaced by

(III-12 1 )
While I do not have a general solution of this new system of equations
which I can compare with a general solution of the old system, I will now

1

R.G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, eiThe General Theory of Second Best, 11
Review of Economic Studies~ Vo:i.. 24 (1'356-57),

·-12·-

pick a set of values for the parameter s which gives the result that domestic
income is lower in t:1e Hmixed ecm:omy'" t'l-i.an in the

11

pre-capit alisti. economy.

For both the npre-cap italist" and ;;mixed. 1 ; economies I let y
B is .2 in the

11

pre-capi talist 1' society and .4 in the

11

=

.8 and PA

mixedc: society.

= PH

= l;

Thus the

foreigner s bring a technolog y to manufactt- .ring that is more labor-int ensive
than the native manufactu ri:1g firms were using,

100, the labor stock is 100s fA = .90, and

£

11

Initially the capital stock is

= .30.

1

With these parameter values, output and domestic income in the \ipre-cap italist"
economy is 117 .09.

i.fow suppose the foreigner s bring up

10 units of capital

(FK = 10); suppose B becomes .4, and suppos~ all manufactu ring firms maximize
profits.

Then output in the ;".'.lixed econcmy" falls to 111.20 and domestic

income is 106. 71.

The rate of return on capital falls fro,'l .59 to .45, and the
')

wage rates rises froo • .58 to • 62. ,_

':lwse results a.re summarize d in Columns

(1) and (4) of Table 2.

1A

in the

11

· 1 equi· 1i·b rium
·
part1.a
- mig1i1.:
· '- · suggest th a t tne
approacn
" wage ra t e i s h.1.gh er
pre-capi: :alist': economy than it would be if all firms maximized profits.

In agricultu re, for example, the average product of labor is

~'"A
F

agricultu ral wage is .9
[

LA

i

•2

If labor ,·!ere paid its marginal product, the

J..'-A

agricultu ral wage would be .8

T7
[

and so the

L,

1·2

However, the general equilibriu m solution

Ji

indicates that the wage rate in the ' 1pre-capi talist'' economy is .58, which is less
than the equilibriu n. wage rate of _61 wher: all firms maximize profits.
2 r.n.. • 1
· paper d oes not aea
., 1 w1.tn
. - d omestic
1'Vul. e t h 1.s
· savings,
.
'
d 1.str
.
ib ution
.
tn<::
of
income is obviously important for future t0tal income if the marginal prope&sit y
to save of workers diffe~s from that of capitalis ts.

-12a-

Table 2

"Pre--capitalist"
(2)
(1)

HMixed"
(3)

(4)

Labor (L)

100

100

100

100

Capital (K)

100

100

100

100

0

0

10

10

Labor Share in Agriculture (fA)

. _,

~9

.9

.9

Labor Share in Manufacturing (fr-1)

.3

Foreign Capital (:51()

('.\

Agricultural Output (QA)

37 .51

47.73

45.97

34.71

Manufacturing Output: (Qi1)

79 .53

70.95

78.86

76.49

Total Output (Y)

117.09

118.68

124083

111.20

Domestic Income (DI)

117.09

112, .68

118068

106. 71

Interest Rate (r)

,59

.62

,.62

.45

Wage Rate (w)

" SR
~

.57

.57

.62

.3

.8

.8

.8

.2

.2

.4

Exponent on Labor in .:::obb-r:ouglas:
(a) in Agriculture
(b) in Manufacturing

,,
o

L~
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m1at is the economic ,:story 1 beh:Lnd these results?
foreigners can be div5.ded into three parts;

The impact of the

a change in the allocation of

labor and local capital because of a change in the behavior of manufacturing

firms, the impact of the increase in the stock of capital, and a change in
the allocation of labor and capital because of the ne,-1 technology in
manufacturing.
Changing the mentality of all manufacturers leads them to change the
capital-labor ratio; witl1 my parameters the capital-labor ratio in manufacturing
rises from 2.26 in the "pre-capitalist;'. economy to 3, 71 in. the "mixed'; economy
and falls slightly in ag;:i.culture, fron .108 to .103.
and the interest rate is higher.
output of manufacturing contracts.

The ,vage rate is lower,

Honey costs are higter in manufacturing, and
As both labor and capital shift into

agriculturei the value of the extra a3:r.icultcral output is more than the

value of the lost maw_1facturing ,,utput, and so the value of total output
rises by about one perce:ct, fron: lU.09 tc 118.68.

This result can be seen

by comparing Columns (l) and (2) in Table 2,
The effect of inc~easin8 tP.e stoc~ of capital from lOG to 110--given the
change in bP.havio~--is to reduce the output of asriculture and to increase the
output of manufac;:ures, but the increase in total output--from 118.68 to 124.83-
is absorbed by the foreign capitalists, a:id so domestic incor:,e remains at
118.68; tnis result .:.-.un be seen by comparing Columns (2) and (3) in Table 2.
The effect of intr.oducir..g the more labor-intensive technology in the
1
entire manufacturing sector --given the change in behavior and the increase in
1

For evidence that foreirsn and loca1 fir:ms i,.-1 manufacturinr have about the
same capital-la't:or ratios~ see Be:ijamic1 I, Cohen? ''Cor::parative Behavior of
Foreign and Domesti,~ Export :Firl!!s ii1 a :')eveloping Eccnomy," Revie,;; of Economics
and Statistics (f~rthcoEing).

-14-

capital--is to lower the capHal-labor ratio in manufacturing to 2.07 and to
raise it to .15 in agricultnre.

The wage rate increases and the interest rate

falls; output falls in both sectors.

Total output falls from 124.83 to 111.20, and

domestic income falls by 10 percent. from 118.68 to 106.71.
be seen by comparing Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.

These results can

-15IV.
In conclusior., some argue that the multinational firm brings a more
capital intensive technology than local firms were using because it pays less
for capital and :1.s more familiar with the advanced technology of the rich
countries, which, it is argued~ is capital-intensive in response to expensive
labor and cheap capital.

Others argue that the foreign firm brings a more

labor intensive technology ·::ban the local firms because it can better scan
the earth's entire

11

shelf 11 of available technologies and is less influenced

by Hirrationaln consic'.erations (such as the prestige of a capital-intensive
factory).

Vernon, :in assef sing the available published evidence, says "the

actual facts are, as usual, obscure.

The:re are no co~:.prehensive data on the

degree to which multinatior:al enterprises adapt their production processes
to the conditions of less~developed countries, and scarcely any data at all
on the comparatfve adaptive actions of local competitors. ,al
a formal statement illustrating the importa.'lce

of

This paper is

technology--in either a

one sector model or a two sector model-·-in assessing the impact of foreign
investors in terms of both the total size of domestic iuco~e and its distribution
between labor and domestic capital.

1

Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay, The Hultinational Spread of UoS.
Enterprises (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 181.

